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Byng's and Currie's
Commanders
A Still Untold Story
of the Canadian Corps
Patrick H. Brennan

I

n 1915, the Canadian Corps was little more
than a rabble of enthusiastic amateurs. Yet by
1917-18, it had become an accomplished
professional fighting force, one characterized by
Denis Winter as "much the most effective unit
in the BEF" and by Shane Schreiber as "the
shock army of the British Empire." While
Canadian military historians have studied this
evolution extensively few have examined the
decisive element in the transformation - the
development of a cadre of proficient senior
combat officers. No one questions Currie's status
as Canada's best fighting general, but of the
supporting team he and his predecessor, General
Byng, assembled we know precious little. Who,
then, were the men commanding the Corps' four
divisions, 12 infantry brigades and supporting
machine gun and artillery units - the senior
officers whose abilities as trainers and fighters
were integral to the CEF's battlefield success?
1

F r o m F l a n d e r s to V i m y these m a i n l y
Canadian-born, militia-trained officers learned
h o w to c o m m a n d by c o m m a n d i n g . T h e i r
apprenticeship taught them that their militia
training hardly prepared them for the war in
which they were now engaged, and that the
militia's patronage-ridden system of promotion
in a fighting army got men killed. Fighting a
modern war d e m a n d e d that all ranks be
properly trained and equipped professionals.
From hard lessons they developed the "Canadian
w a y of war" characterized by m e t i c u l o u s
planning, training and rehearsal, artilleryinfantry co-ordination, and innovative tactics.
T w o factors p r o v e d essential to this

transformation, and contributed mightily to the
Canadian army's growing success on the Western
Front. The first was the establishment of the
merit principal in promotion at the senior level,
a process underway by 1916 and confirmed by
Sam Hughes' removal in November, 1916. In
theory at least, Hughes' firing cleared the path
for Canada's "best and brightest" officers to take
command of the nation's army. The second was
the institutionalization and standarization of
learning within the army - a policy implemented
by Byng and expanded by Currie in which the
battalion, brigade and divisional commanders
p l a y e d a central and i n d i s p e n s a b l e role.
Professionalization of the senior officer corps
was thus a crucial step in the transformation of
the CEF into a first-rate fighting force.
2

Military historians have largely inferred what
is known about the men who commanded the
Corps' infantry divisions and brigades and
specialized supporting arms. Good armies have
good commanders; from Vimy Ridge onward the
Canadian Corps was very good, Ipso facto, our
commanders must have been very good. But our
knowledge of these individuals extends little
beyond this generalization. Jack Granatstein
c o n c l u d e d in The Generals, his study of
Canada's Second World War commanders, that
the Hundred Days "demonstrated...Canadian
generals were the peers of those in any country."
A.M.J. Hyatt, Currie's biographer, has more
cautiously asserted that while "a description of
Canadian generals during the First World War
is hardly a tale of great captains, one could argue
that the quality of generalship among Canadians
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General Sir Julien Byng talking to Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie, February 1918.
4

In France was very high." Why have Byng's and
Currie's commanders, with rare exceptions, not
been s t u d i e d ? Perhaps, as A r t h u r L o w e r
concluded, Canadians "became intensely proud
of their fighting men, though characteristically
they took little interest in their generals."
Unfortunately, this disinterest has also extended
to Canada's military historians.
5

6

Who were the combat officers of general rank
who served under Byng and Currie during the
period from late May 1916 through the end of
the war? This study includes only those who held
their appointments for an extended period - at
least two months - with those whose tenures
were terminated by the end of hostilities
naturally excepted. Of these 48 officers, seven
were British regulars, leaving 41 members of
the CEF.
7

Drawing on the personnel records of these
i n d i v i d u a l s , one can draw several useful
generalizations. Most - 74 percent - were
Canadian-born, a notably higher proportion than
was found among the ranks (generally accepted
at only slightly more than 50 percent) and even
among battalion commanders where the figure
was 65 percent. At the time of enlistment, they
were almost equally split between Central
6
8

9
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Canada and the West: eleven lived in Ontario,
nine in Quebec, seven in British Columbia, four
in M a n i t o b a , three each in A l b e r t a and
Saskatchewan, and one in Nova Scotia. Their
average year of birth was 1873, and for those
serving at war's end, when the GOC Heavy
Artillery and six of the 12 infantry brigadiers
were in their thirties, their average age was 42.
Only three were francophones, and one of those
- Brutinel - was a French national. As for
religion, 62 percent were Anglicans, 21 percent
Presbyterians, with Odium the lone Methodist.
Only two of the anglophones - Elmsley and A.H.
Macdonell - were Roman Catholic.
10

11

All of them had prewar military experience,
though it had been obtained in a variety of ways:
nine were Canadian regulars at the war's
outbreak, two had once served in the British
army and another in the French, while the
remaining 27 had served in the Canadian militia.
A dozen had South African War experience, and
22 of the 27 from the infantry commanded a
battalion at the front.
Their prewar careers confirm that most were
solidly ensconced in the middle class with
c a r e e r s in the m i l i t a r y , b u s i n e s s or the
professions. Apart from the nine serving in the

2
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regular forces (Burstall, Elmsley, Ketchen,
MacBrien, the two Macdonells, Panet, Thacker
and W i l l i a m s ) , a further two listed their
occupation as "soldier" (Bell and Hilliam).
Professional occupations accounted for a further
dozen, including seven lawyers (John Clark,
Embury, Griesbach, Hill, McLaren, Ormond and
Alexander Ross), four engineers (Brutinel,
Garnet Hughes, McNaughton and Tremblay),
and one dentist (Stewart). Only two - Draper
and Dyer - listed their occupations as farmers.
Most of the remainder were in business and
related activities: three were merchants (Rennie,
Turner and Tuxford), McCuaig was a stock
broker, while Arthur Currie, Dodds, and Odium
were in real estate and insurance. King was in
manufacturing, as was Loomis who was also a
building contractor. John Ross was a miller.
There was one senior civil servant (W. Hughes, a
prison inspector), one newspaper publisher
(Watson), one journalist (Odium's other career),
a "secretary" (Mitchell), and an "agent" (Robert
Clark).
They were also a homogeneous group in
another way - those who got to France generally
stayed there. Tenure of command was
pronounced among senior officers during the 29
month long Byng-Currie regime. At the end of
M a y 1916, B y n g i n h e r i t e d 2 2 s e n i o r
commanders: four divisional commanders, 12
infantry brigadiers, three divisional artillery
commanders, GOCs Royal Artillery (GOCRA)
and Heavy Artillery (GOCHA) and a BrigadierGeneral, General Staff. Of these, Mercer was
promptly killed and Williams taken prisoner in
the s a m e action, n e c e s s i t a t i n g L i p s e t t ' s
promotion to divisional command, Loomis's
switch to replace Lipsett (and Odium's
promotion from battalion to replace Loomis),
and Elmsley's promotion from command of a
cavalry regiment to replace Williams. Turner's
replacement by Burstall as OC 2nd Division
necessitated Morrison's promotion to GOCRA,
and Panet's promotion to replace Morrison. Only
four of the remaining senior commanders Byng
inherited were replaced during the ensuing
twelve months, all of them, including Sam
Hughes' brother and son, for reasons which to
varying degrees related to performance. Of 22
officers, 15 were still there in one capacity or
another when Byng left the Corps.
12

Of the 25 senior c o m m a n d e r s Currie
inherited in June 1917 (including Currie's own
replacement as OC the 1st Division, A . C .
Macdonell), Thirteen were still there at the
armistice 17 months later. Of those Currie
replaced, four were British or ex-British regulars
who moved back to the British army and another
- Bell - h a d b e e n w o u n d e d .
F r o m the
remainder of that initial cadre, Loomis replaced
Lipsett as OC 3rd Division while Rennie, A . H .
Macdonell, Elmsley, McLaren and Hill were
replaced as Brigadiers chiefly (though in
Macdonell's case, certainly not solely) because
they had worn out. The removal of Ketchen and
Mitchell was dictated by performance.
13

1 4

15

M o s t s t r i k i n g i s n o t the n u m b e r o f
replacements but the number who continued to
soldier on efficiently. Including Currie himself,
seven officers served the full period, another
seven served from two years to 28 months, while
seven more served between 18 and 23 months.
From the middle of 1916 onward, only a relative
handful - maybe six - of the 42 Canadian officers
seem to have been replaced for "deficient
performance" without at least the extenuating
circumstance of exhausting service at the front.
Another six fell into the latter category, several
of them after a long period of e x e m p l a r y
service.
16

17

Byng and Currie's commanders were a selfconfident group who had grown accustomed to
leading and winning, important qualities in
successful combat officers. A significant number
had been with the army from the start at "Bloody
Ypres" - seven future divisional commanders,
eight infantry brigadiers, a GOCRA and GOCHA
and three divisional artillery commanders.
Some were promoted by virtue of Sam Hughes'
patronage, most by virtue of merit, and not a
few by virtue of both. Socio-economic profiles
and tenures in command tell us some things
about these men but explain little about how they
performed individually, the level at which our
understanding of them remains so deficient. A
brief examination of the careers of four of these
officers - William Griesbach, Frederick Loomis,
Alex Ross and David Watson - confirms the value
of more thorough studies.
18

William "Billy" Griesbach was born in 1878
in the prairie hamlet of Qu'Appelle in what is
now Saskatchewan, the son of a North West
7
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Brigadier-General William "Billy" Griesbach (right) with
Brigadier-General H.M Dyer.

Byng approved his promotion to command the
1st Brigade in February 1917.
20

Little direct information survives on how
Griesbach's men viewed their commander. He
seems to have been respected rather than
"loved," at least in the way Macdonell was "loved"
by his men. Griesbach was sharp and brusque,
a strict but fair disciplinarian, and a stickler for
details. Certainly he was as demanding of himself
as he was of his men. Despite presenting a rather
intimidating demeanor to subordinates, he went
out of his way to listen to them, and he seems to
have been an excellent teacher. Manifestly brave,
he did not shirk from putting himself in harm's
way, something his officers and men must have
admired.

Mounted Police officer and former British army
regular. The young Griesbach saw action in
South Africa as a trooper with the 2nd Canadian
Mounted Rifles (CMR), subsequently serving in
the militia in Edmonton where he pursued a
successful career in law and politics. Griesbach
undoubtedly used his militia involvement to
make useful political and professional contacts,
as did most of his peers, but he was also noted
as one who took his avocation very seriously.
Griesbach went overseas with the first contingent
as commanding officer of the cavalry, only to be
asked by his friend Sam Hughes to return to
C a n a d a and raise an infantry b a t t a l i o n .
Griesbach agreed reluctantly, on the minister's
promise that the 49th would serve in the line
and not be broken up as reinforcements.
19

Griesbach and his men found themselves in
the Ypres salient in mid-October 1915, and the
"Forty-Niners" saw their first heavy action in the
crushing German attack at Mount Sorrel in June
1916. Though badly mauled, the unit helped
blunt the enemy advance. The confused and
bloody fighting at Kenora Trench on the Somme
saw the 49th chewed up a second time, but both
his brigadier, Archie "Batty Mac" Macdonell and
divisional commander, Louis Lipsett, had seen
enough to recommend Griesbach for a brigade
command. Despite Currie's initial reluctance,

G r i e s b a c h b e l i e v e d that i f h i s m e n
experienced success, they would believe in
themselves, and their morale and preparation
for combat became high priorities. No where was
this attribute more in evidence than in his
tireless preparation for the transition to semiopen and open warfare the Corps anticipated in
1918. "No man [wjould be allowed to get back
to Canada and say that he had a good idea or
suggestion upon any subject connected with the
war and that he could not get it considered by a
higher authority," he liked to remind his
officers.
Even though Griesbach wryly
acknowledged that "most officers behave much
better in actual warfare than they do in
manoeuvers, he monitored his battalion training
exercises with a critical eye. Mistakes were
opportunities for learning - ruthlessly exposed
but constructively discussed. He had long
believed in allowing his battalion commanders
some leeway in planning and executing their
attacks. Open warfare, he knew, would make still
greater demands on their initiative.
Consequently he designed exercises to encourage
initiative and adaptability at all levels of
command. After two and a half years of the
hardest experience, Griesbach had learned
much, and his ideas on how to master the
battlefield were crystallizing. Dissecting one
disappointing training exercise, he reminded the
two participating battalion commanders that:
21

The essence of success in the attack is to bring
a superior number of troops in on a point where
the enemy is weak and absolutely assure success

8
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at that point. In a task of this sort swiftness and
decision is [sic] necessary... Commanders must
learn to appreciate situations. They must learn
to deliver a real punch based upon a sound
conception.
22

In an army where the abler commanders
were intent on learning how to apply
technological firepower to the battlefield,
Griesbach was especially noteworthy. His
memoranda to Macdonell and Corps during
1918 are full of recommendations on how best
to organize the principal elements of the attack
- field artillery, machine guns and tanks - in
light of the rapidly evolving battlefield conditions
that characterized the Last Hundred D a y s .
23

Griesbach's greatest tactical stroke came in
the 1st Brigade's attack on the Vise-en-Artois
Switch on the early morning of 30 August 1918,
part of the preliminaries to the Drocourt-Queant
attack. The plan was principally Griesbach's own
design - he had laboured throughout the
previous day to draw up three versions, finally
settling on the more risky but promising option
and then winning the approval of Macdonell and
his staff. Macdonell was right to call it "bold."
In a sort of long left-hook, Griesbach's infantry
pushed north behind an ingenious artillery
barrage expertly thrown together by Thacker that
crossed the face of the D-Q Line to the east to
take the Switch in the flank. Heavy casualties
were inflicted on the enemy, all for the loss of
fewer than 700 of his men.
24

But what the official history describes as a
"skillfully planned operation carried out with
daring" almost came unstuck. Many of his
infantry had become disoriented by the odd axis
of attack, parallel to the main enemy defensive
position. Failing to face east once the Switch had
been taken left the flank open to a strong enemy
counterattack w h i c h , in due c o u r s e , the
Germans provided. Only the intervention of the
2nd Battalion's commander, Lieutenant-Colonel
L o m e McLaughlin, pistol drawn with purpose,
rallied panicking troops at the point where the
Germans almost broke through. Griesbach's
decisive action to send forward his reserve
battalion stabilized the situation.
25

Macdonell was effusive in his praise of the
operation, and attributed the success to his
companies' and platoons' mastery of open
warfare tactics. The commanding officer of the

1st B a t t a l i o n , L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l A l b e r t
Sparling, maintained that "it was only from
previous training and initiative on the part of all
ranks that the situation was grasped and the
attack pressed forward so successfully...," while
Griesbach concluded that "the brigade benefited
tremendously by the training in open warfare
that it received.. .during the months of May and
June last.. .and the attack methods there taught
were practiced with success."
26

Griesbach became a successful commander
for s e v e r a l r e a s o n s . N e v e r s a t i s f i e d , his
observant after-battle reports started with a
critique of his own plan, then proceeded to
highlight specific deficiencies revealed in the
Corps' capabilities. There was much that was
typically "Canadian" of Griesbach. Like so many
of them, he applied his talents and selfconfidence earned from a successful civilian
profession to the profession of war. Thrown into
combat command with minimal preparation,
Griesbach made his share of mistakes in 1916
but he survived them. He readily acknowledged
the benefits of being mentored by a talented
senior - Macdonell - under whose immediate
command he served for all but six of his 37
months at the front.
Griesbach was a successful commander
because he could study war and carefully
incorporate what he learned. In an army that
institutionalized, then universalized what it had
learned, officers like Griesbach made a valuable
contribution and naturally found their way to
the top. Finally, Griesbach worked well on the
battlefield: "Courageous, resolute,.. .full of daring
and resourcefulness," in the words of the
admiring Macdonell, possessed of a "wellbalanced and analytical mind...," and "the
quickest officer that I have ever had anything to
do with to grasp the tactical advantages or
disadvantages of a given situation...."
27

Rather less is known about the career of
Frederick Oscar William Loomis. He was born
in Sherbrooke in the Eastern Townships in
1870. By the outbreak of the war, he had
established a thriving manufacturing and
contracting business in Montreal, where he also
served in the militia. In the fall of 1914, Loomis
went overseas as c o m m a n d e r of the 13th
Battalion that he handled capably in the chaos
of 2nd Ypres. Loomis was appointed temporary
9
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commander of the 7th Brigade in March 1916,
replacing A.C. Macdonell who was ill. He moved
to the 11th Brigade for two months, and finally
to the 2nd Brigade - an all-Western Canadian
unit - in early July as Lipsett's replacement.
There, with the exception of three months'
compassionate leave to Canada in early 1918,
he remained in command until early September
1918. Currie thought him one of his ablest
brigadiers, commenting once that "brigadiers
like him do not grow on gooseberry bushes [and]
and I would not lose him for the world...."
28

During his tenure with the 2nd, Loomis was
involved in several bitter engagements. His
troops spearheaded the last Canadian attack at
Passchendaele, on 10 November 1917 where the
survivors had to hold on to their captured
positions against a ferocious German counterbombardment. An Australian noted grimly of
their situation: "If the Canadians can hold on,
they are wonderful troops." Hold on they did,
surely a compliment to their tenacity, but also
to their commander's abilities to train and lead
them.
29

The highlight of Loomis's war came in early
September 1918, when a reluctant MajorGeneral Lipsett was transferred to the British
army. Earlier in the year, Currie had identified
30

five of his brigadiers suitable for divisional
command.
As a successful fighting officer
almost continuously since the spring of 1915,
Loomis was Currie's choice to command the 2nd
D i v i s i o n . It w a s a s i n g u l a r h o n o u r . A
"Canadianization" policy meant that Canadian
officers could only be promoted within the fourdivison Corps. The highest command most
Canadian infantry officers could hope for was a
brigade. The rapid collapse of the German army
allowed Loomis to exercise his command in only
one major engagement, but the thrust across the
Canal du Nord in late September involved some
very heavy fighting by his division. His war ended
in Mons, where he can be seen, but is rarely
identified, among the senior Canadian officers
taking part in the ceremonies marking the
liberation of the town on 11 November 1918.
31

In 1914, Alexander Ross was practising law
in Regina. The Scottish immigrant was then 34
years old. Ross did not enlist in the first
c o n t i n g e n t o n the a d v i c e o f his m i l i t i a
commander, J.F.L. Embury, who hoped his unit
would be sent overseas intact. When Ottawa
authorized a second contingent, Embury was
a p p o i n t e d c o m m a n d i n g officer o f the
Saskatchewan contribution, the 28th Battalion,
and Ross joined as a company commander. By
the time he reached France in the fall of 1915,

Brigadier F.O.W. Loomis (middle
row, centre) with his HQ staff, 2nd
Canadian Infantry Brigade, April
1918:
Front row, I. to r.- Major R.H.
Winslow. Captains H.D. Ives, R.J.
Paget.
Centre row - Lieutenants S.C.
Graham, Major J P . Mackenzie,
Loomis,
Captains
E.H.L
Johnston, E.L. Brown.
Rear row - L i e u t e n a n t H.W.
D a w s o n , C a p t a i n G r a n t and
Lieutenant M. de Bishop.
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Above: General Sir Arthur Currie taking the salute in the Grand
Place in Mons during the march past. General Loomis is the 5th
figure to the right of Currie, in front of the other officers. MajorGeneral E.W.B. Morrison, commander of Canadian Corps
artillery is to the left of Loomis and Brigadier G.J. Farmar,
DA&QMG is to the right. 11 November 1918.
Right: Brigadier-General Alexander Ross.

he had been promoted second-in-command with
the rank of Major. The 28th underwent its
"baptism of fire" at St. Eloi in the spring of 1916,
a chaotic battle which Ross later remembered
as "discouraging." Many officers were replaced
after St. Eloi, though not enough to satisfy Ross.
On the Somme, the 28th was involved in very
heavy and costly fighting. Early on, Embury, who
was already suffering from "the strain of duties,"
was wounded and had to be replaced. Byng
tabbed Ross to take over.
It proved quite an apprenticeship, but, like
Griesbach, Ross survived. He felt the Canadians
were finally beginning to learn some valuable
lessons which would save infantrymen's lives,
starting with "proper artillery support...,
attacking on a wider front with fewer men in the
front [line] and more in support and, of course,
[all with] the general knowledge of what they were
to do, and... preparation down to the very last
detail...."
Byng organized meetings of
divisional, brigade and battalion commanders
and other officers where the hard-earned lessons
of the Somme and new tactical ideas were frankly
discussed. As Ross vividly remembered 47 years
later, "He [Byng] revolutionized a lot of our
organization and made it much more sensible...
32
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[and] he gave me new ideas, things that appealed
to my common sense." Byng also was willing
to listen to Canadian officers who, with their
basically civilian mindsets, were more open to
learning and had less to forget.
33

Ross was an able pragmatist, representing
the Canadian militia officer at his best. He joked
that he ran his battalion like he ran his law office
in Regina, but few could argue with the results.
Vital in an army that almost always attacked,
Ross clearly had a knack for maintaining esprit
de corps among his veterans while rapidly
integrating inexperienced reinforcements. He
was keen on promotion from the ranks as well,
preferring that men "who had learned in the
field" train and lead. In battle, Ross proved his
coolness under fire, and he reveled in the
i n d e p e n d e n c e he e n j o y e d as a b a t t a l i o n
commander. "The higher echelons had to tell you
what their plan was but you had to carry it out
and the less they interfered the better...," he later
emphasized. "It was left to you largely as to how
you were going to do it."
34

Ross was on the list of 12 officers Currie
was considering for promotion to brigadier in
1918.
His opportunity came during the
Drocourt-Queant attack when Bell was wounded
and the Corps commander picked him to take
35

over the 6th Brigade, a post he held until the
armistice. Ross's service as a brigadier was brief,
but it points out that a pool of talented officers
was available when the men were required - eight
were promoted to brigade commands in 1918.
It also vindicates the struggles of Byng, Currie
and others to ensure merit ruled promotion and
t o e s t a b l i s h the o r g a n i z e d d o c t r i n e o f
preparation and attack in the CEF that ensured
such command transitions would be relatively
seamless.
David Watson, the 4th Division's only
commander, was a rather more controversial
figure. Watson was a self-made man who became
a wealthy Quebec City newspaper publisher with
a "successful" militia career. He was also deeply
involved in Conservative party politics, and
much admired by Sam Hughes. On cursory
examination, Watson's career seems to fit the
mould of the successful militia officer who
enlisted in 1914 and led a battalion (the 2nd)
overseas. He fought at Second Ypres with some
competence and was soon promoted to
command a brigade (the 5th). In May 1916, he
received the plumb job - command of the newlyformed 4th D i v i s i o n . Watson is most
remembered as one of two wealthy officers
(Odium was the other) who covered Sir Arthur
Currie's bad debts and thus saved Canada's
greatest
military
c h i e f from
public
embarrassment and possible dismissal in
1917. However, upon closer examination,
Watson's military career was somewhat more
disputed.
36

Even by the generous standard of senior
militia officers in the CEF, the dashing, charming
Watson was a hopeless self-promoter. In the
aftermath of the St. Eloi debacle in February
1916, one of his b a t t a l i o n c o m m a n d e r s ,
Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Gunn, was intent on
resigning and demanded to air his grievances
about Watson with the Army commander. Fearing
he would lose his chance of commanding of the
n e w 4th Division - a post he had openly
campaigned for - if the criticisms got out, he
offered the disgruntled Gunn one of the brigades
in his new division. Although Gunn flatly rejected
Watson's offer, he agreed not to forward his letter
of resignation up the chain of command. After
the war, Gunn regretted that he had not pressed
the matter "as Watson later, through bad
Major-General David Watson, commander of
4th Canadian Division.
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Officers watch a practice attack, October 1917. Left to right: Prince Arthur of Connaught, Lieutenant-General Arthur
Currie, Brigadier Victor Odium and Major-General David Watson.

judgement and looking for kudos, cost the lives
of many Canadians."
37

Watson's campaigning paid off as Hughes
gave him the 4th Division, rather than Henry
Burstall, an experienced regular. Watson then
gathered as many experienced troops in England
for his new unit as he could find, despite
knowing none of them would see battle for
months at a time when the army in France was
desperately seeking reinforcements. When the
going got tough for Hughes, Watson was wise
enough to distance himself. Gunn was not the
only subordinate officer to take issue with
Watson's competence. By the end of 1917,
Lieutenant-Colonel John Warden, who had
raised the 102nd Battalion and then commanded
it in Watson's division, had completely fallen out
with both his brigadier (Odium) and Watson.
Warden resigned his command, but not before
regaling Currie with his opinions of his two
superiors, describing "both [as] very mercenary
men and political pullers w h o used their
commands to gain public notice and repute.... "
The evidence is little more than gossip, of course,
but with Watson, the evidence does seem to
accumulate.
38

that increasingly prevailed among other CEF
commanders. This was clear in the ill-fated 4th
Division trench raid on Hill 145 a little over a
month before Vimy. This operation cost 687
casualties when the gas attack failed to work,
precisely what more cautious observers in the
division - including several senior officers - had
openly worried about. Both Watson and his very
able British G S O l , Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund
Ironside, displayed appalling overconfidence and
particularly a lamentable - and for their troops,
fatal - ignorance of gas warfare practices.
A l t h o u g h Watson's 4th Division generally
performed ably thereafter, the 11th and 12th
Brigades' foredoomed attack at Mont Dury on 2
S e p t e m b e r 1918 suggests that haste and
sloppiness at divisional headquarters were never
entirely eliminated. The verdict on Watson's
military competence - whether he should be
classed among the first or second echelon of
Canada's Great War commanders - awaits
further research.
40

41

3 9

More damning was Watson's apparently
excessive eagerness to fight the Hun, without a
matching eagerness for the thorough planning

Regardless of the ultimate verdict passed on
Watson, by the last two years of the war the
overall quality of Canadian combat generals was
high and getting higher. Given that brigadiers
had a better chance to control the battle as tactics
became more fluid and complex, good brigadiers
became more important to battlefield success
as the war progressed. Moreover, the well13
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Allied commanders in Bonn,
Germany following the end of the
war, December 1918:
(I. to r.) Lieutenant-General Arthur
Currie, commander, Canadian
Corps; unknown; Major -General
David Watson, commander 4th
Canadian Division; Major-General
Henry Burstall, commander 2nd
Canadian Division; Field Marshal
Alexander Haig, British
Commander-in-Chief; MajorGeneral E.W.B. Morrison,
commander of Canadian Corps
artillery.

developed Canadian system of institutionalized,
universalized learning would never have
flourished had the senior commanders not been
innovative and fully c o m m i t t e d . The only
alternative is to believe that the Corps' success
depended almost entirely on Currie and a
handful of brilliant British staff officers.
A study of Byng and Currie's commanders
will appreciably broaden our understanding of
what made the Canadian Corps an increasingly
effective fighting force from 1916 onward. What
did "merit" mean when it came to promotion to
senior command? Did divisional and brigade
commanders possess individual training and
war fighting philosophies and styles? Can we
rank the capabilities of these commanders or
were they interchangeable cogs in the CEF
m a c h i n e ? If,
as Harris s u m m a r i z e s
McNaughton's recollections, "Currie created an
atmosphere which allowed for, in fact positively
d e m a n d e d , the m o v e m e n t of i d e a s from
below," who were the foremost generators of
those ideas?
42

Military historians have provided us with a
portrayal of the Canadian Corps where the
military personalities of the Corps commanders,
various political characters, and the private
soldier have been quite thoroughly researched
and their respective roles in forging the Corps'
fighting ability skillfully delineated. But of those
few dozen officers who served immediately below
the "Great Captain," practically nothing has been
written and very little is known. Even the role of
the Corps' chaplains has received more study.
Yet all military historians acknowledge the
hierarchical command structure of the army and
the vital importance of understanding how that
structure operated. Furthermore, despite the
"Currie-centrism" which has dominated analysis
of the Corps' generalship, implicit in all accounts
of the Corps during the battles of 1917-18 is the
belief that it was a team effort. Surely, as with
ordinary soldiers, sappers and gunners, the
senior officer ranks contained more than their
share of talented individuals - men who had
significant responsibilities for transforming the
Corps from an enthusiastic rabble into a battlehardened and self-confident professional army.
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We are unlikely to find that all our generals were
the equals of a Griesbach, Ross or Loomis. Some
will likely prove pedestrian or worse. But until
we undertake fuller studies, our understanding
of the Corps will remain incomplete, for we shall
have only a fragmentary appreciation of the
officers who trained the Corps' soldiers and then
ordered (and sometimes led) them into battle.
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